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【博雅双语名家名作】费孝通：中国士绅（四）
中国士绅——城乡关系论集China’s Gentry—Essays in Rural-Urban Relations
作者简介：费孝通，著名社会学家、人类学家、民族学家、社会活动家，中国社会学和人类学的奠基人之一。
内容简介：费孝通英文口述基础上编撰的对中国农村和中国社会的总体描述。其中，传统社会中文人和士绅的作用，和乡村和城市之间的关系，对认识中国传统社会的“超稳定结构”具有重要意义，更是理解中国近代社会剧变的关键。
There was a weak point, however, in this centralized monarchical system. He who held power, the emperor, as I have said, could not administer the country by himself. Even though he might not wish to share his authority, he still required help in ruling and must therefore employ officials. These officials, with whom the ruling house had no ties of kinship, functioned merely as servants with administrative power but no power of policy-making. It was within the inefficiencies of this system that the ordinary man found his opportunity to carry on his private concerns. 不过，这种集权的专制统治有一个弱点，正如我说的那样，掌握政权的皇帝，不能独自管理国家。即使他不愿意让别人分享权力，他仍需要任命官吏做助手和代理，协助其实施统治。这些官吏与皇室没有亲戚关系，如同皇帝的雇佣，他们没有立法权，只有行政管理权。在这种效率低下的制度下，普通百姓才有机会产生私欲。
It is true that previous to the unification of Ch’in (221 B.C.) there were attempts to establish an efficient administrative system. This was done under the influence of the Fa Chia, or Legalist, school of thought. Theoretically, the system proposed by this school of thought was a good one.In order to have an efficient administration of the country, a legal basis must be established, with everyone controlled by the same law. Shang Yang, as prime minister of Ch’in, attempted to put this theory into practice. But the theory unfortunately neglected one small point. One man, the emperor, was left outside the law. And this omission destroyed the whole system of the Fa Chia. 在秦朝统一国家（公元前 221 年）以前，确实曾有些人想要建立一个富有效率的行政机构。这是受到了法家学派的思想的影响。从理论上来讲，这一学派提出的体系是好的。 有效率的行政机构必须是一个法制的机构，所有人都要受到同样的法律的控制。作为秦国宰相的商鞅试图要将这一理论付诸实践。可不幸的是，这一理论有一点小小的疏忽——有一个人没有被纳入法律之内，那就是天子。这留在法律之外的一个人却把法家的整个体系废黜了。
Shang Yang himself lost his life on this account, for, though under the law he was able to punish the prince when he was only the heir to the throne, as soon as the prince became emperor, he ordered Shang Yang killed. And the efficient system which Shang Yang himself had established prevented him from escaping. 商鞅因此自己把命丢了，尽管在法律之下，他能够对还只是王位继承人的太子加以惩罚，但是太子一当上皇帝就下令将商鞅杀掉，由商鞅自己所建立起来的高效率的体系也使他自己在劫难逃。
If the highest authority were bound by law, then administrative authority would be able to cage the tiger. But in Chinese history this has never happened. As a result, the ruled, including the officials themselves, have never sought for efficiency in administration. Rather the opposite has been true. Inefficiency and parasitism, on the one hand, remoteness of imperial control and a do-nothing policy by the emperor, on the other—this has always been the ideal. Yet this ideal of government, of a “good emperor” as one who presided but did not rule, has rarely been attained. As far as the officials were concerned, the next best thing, then, could only be to protect themselves, to keep a back door open for their relatives, and to be able to use their position as a shield against the emperor’s whims. To protect not only themselves but their relatives and their whole clan from the unchecked power of the monarch, and to do this not by constitutional or by legal means but by personal influence—this is what they sought. Not by challenging the emperor’s authority but by coming close to him, by serving him and from this service gaining an advantage in being enabled to shift the burden of the emperor’s demands onto the backs of those lower down, did the propertied class attempt to neutralize the emperor’s power over them and to avoid the attack of the tiger. Groups of officials, with their relatives, formed, thus, in Chinese society a special class not affected by the laws, exempt from taxation and conscription. Nevertheless, they had no real political power. 如果最高的权威受到了法律的约束，那么行政的权威就能够将这只老虎囚住。但是在中国的历史上，这样的事情从来没有发生过。结果，被统治者——包括官吏自己在内——从来就不追求行政上的效率。实际的情况正是与之相对立。一方面是无效率和寄生，另一方面是天高皇帝远以及皇帝的无为政策——这一直是一种理想的状态。然而这种政府的理想，即是说一位“好皇帝”应当统而不治，这样的皇帝很少有人能够做到。就官吏而言，退而求其次的办法就只能是保护他们自己，为他们的亲戚开后门，并且还能够利用他们的位置作为一种挡箭牌来抵御皇帝的变化无常。要保护的不仅是他们自己，还有他们的亲戚以及整个宗族免遭不受限制的君主权力的侵扰，而且这样做所依靠的并非是宪法或者法律的手段，而是依靠个人的影响力——这就是他们所追求的。有产阶级想要消磨掉皇帝加诸他们身上的权力，并以此来避开这只老虎的攻击，并非是靠对皇帝的权威加以挑战，而是靠亲近皇帝、为皇帝服务，从中获得的一种好处便是能够将皇帝各种要求负担转移给比自己阶层更低者。官僚及其庇护下的亲友集团由此构成了中国社会所特有的一个不受法律影响的阶层，他们有免役免税的特权。虽然如此，但他们并没有真正的政治权力。
To escape domination while approaching the source of power takes a highly developed skill. The position of the officials was not easy. As the old sayings go, “When the emperor orders your death, you must die” and “All the blame is mine; the emperor can do no wrong.” If the official 33relaxed his efforts on behalf of the emperor, he might lose his life. When the emperor required money or labor, he must be active in meeting these demands—a task he accomplished by shifting the burden onto the backs of the people. Yet, if the burdens became too heavy for the people to bear, they might rebel, and it was then the officials who would be attacked first and who would serve as the scapegoats of the monarch. The officials must be two-faced: severe toward the people and compliant toward the emperor. They must know the art of going just so far and no further in order that they might not be caught either by the fury of the emperor or by the wrath of the people. Chinese officials’ life has been described as the art of maneuvering on a stormy sea. Experience through the ages was the teacher. It may be noted that in Chinese the expression, “Do not speak to me officially,” does not mean the same thing as in English but rather, “Speak to me sincerely.”逃避自己想要接近的权力之源的支配，需要有高超的技能。官僚的位置并不轻松。正如古语所言： “君要臣死，臣不得不死” ，还有“臣罪当诛，天王圣明” 。他不能怠工而有损皇帝的利益，否则可能性命不保。当皇帝需要钱或劳力的时候，他必须特别卖力来满足这些需要，即通过把整个的政治负担转嫁到平民身上来完成这项差事。但是，一旦这种负担过重，人民无法承受之时，他们便可能起来造反，到时就是这些官僚们首当其冲地受到攻击，由此而成了国君的替罪羊。官僚们必须有两套面目：对人民严酷而对皇帝顺从。他们必须要知道进退有节，适可而止，以免走了极端而惹恼了皇帝，或者是引起人民的激愤。中国官僚们的生活曾被描述为是在风云变幻的海上运筹帷幄的艺术。代代相传的经验即为人师。应该注意的是，在汉语中所说的“不要打官腔” ，并非与英语字面的意思一样，而实际是在说： “跟我说实话。 ”
In normal times to be an official was no direct economic advantage. From the monarch’s point of view, for an official to use his position to enrich himself meant corruption of the system and a diminution of his own treasure. Thus, unless a monarch were very weak, he would not tolerate such officials. An official in ordinary times would not improperly profit from the office but would leave it with “two sleeves full of wind.” Why, then, should people want to be officials? The poem of T’ao Yuan-ming expresses the feelings of one such man: 在平常的日子里，做官并没有什么直接的经济上的好处。在皇帝看来，官员利用自己的职位来致富，不仅意味着腐化皇权所依赖的制度，而且是皇家财富的减缩。因此，除非某位皇帝软弱无能，否则，他是不会容许有这种官员存在的。处在太平盛世的官员不会不合法地从官位上捞到好处，而只会在离任时留下“两袖清风”。那么，为什么人们还想要做官呢？陶渊明的诗表达了这种感慨：
Why should I be an official? 我为什么要去做官呢？
I bend my back, for only three piculs of rice. 只为五斗米折腰。
Why should I not go back to till the land? 我为什么不归耕田园？
T’ao Yuan-ming was a typical unworldly poet. Yet, in spite of his talent and his interest in the things of the mind, even he had to “bend his back” and occupy an official position and withal receive only a small financial reward. Why did such a one accept this position instead of staying home where he was happy? The fact is that, if he had shown his scorn of officialdom by leaving office, he would probably by now be “a man without an arm.”The choice lay between “bending the back” or being disabled. The necessity for becoming an official was a little like the need for being inoculated. Just as one runs the risk of having a bad reaction 35to an inoculation, so in becoming an official one may risk having one’s property confiscated or even one’s head cut off. But, once the inoculation is over, one has gained protection. This analogy is not too apt, since from an inoculation one person becomes immune, whereas if one has been an official one can protect a whole group of people. As a result, it happened that sometimes a group would join to aid in the education of one man so as to enable him to reach officialdom. “One man rises to officialdom, then all his dogs and chickens will be promoted,” is the saying.陶渊明是一位典型的出世诗人。尽管他富有才气，也很有风雅，但他还是“折了腰” ，身居一个官位，仅仅是为了得到那么一点俸禄。为什么这样的一个人要去接受这样的一个位置，而不是呆在他所喜欢的家里呢？事实恰恰是，如果他真的表现出自己看不上官职，弃官而去，他就可能成为一位“折臂翁”了。 16这就是说必须在“折腰”和“折臂”之间作出选择。做官的必要性有点像打防疫针。正像打防疫针要冒打了过后有不良反应的风险一样，做官就可能要冒抄家和掉脑袋的危险。但是，一旦打了针后，人就可以有免疫力了。这样的比喻略有点不贴切，因为打了防疫针，只能够使一个人自己得到免疫，而做官所能庇护的是一整群的人。结果有时就出现了一大群人资助一个人去读书，以便使他能够获得个一官半职；一人升官，鸡犬安宁。
In Chinese traditional society the clan or big family naturally constituted a group which could take action of this sort, supporting one of their members until the time when he should become a scholar and be eligible for the official examinations. Once this individual attained official honors, the whole clan could rely upon him. Without any strong person at court, it was difficult to protect one’s property. Ku T’ing-lin was an official during the Ming dynasty, but, when the rule passed to the Manchus, he refused to continue in an official position, gave up traveling abroad, and shut himself up at home with his books. Yet for his own protection he was obliged to send his two nephews to the Ch’ing court to serve his enemies. This was made possible by the fact that, as we have said, Chinese officials did not share in the political power of the emperor but served their monarch by neutralizing and softening down his power rather than by supporting it. With his nephews in court, the uncle was protected even in secret rebellious activities. According to Chinese tradition, officials did not work seriously for the government, nor did they like to continue as officials for a long period. Their purpose in entering the government was to gain both immunity and wealth in this order. The Chinese officials when in office protected their relatives, but, when this duty to the family had been performed, they retired. Retirement and even a hermit’s life were the ideal. In retirement there was no longer any authority to be served with watchful care, while the relatives who had gained protection from their kinsman official owed him a debt of gratitude. Now he need only enjoy his social prestige and grow fat and happy. As we say in China, “To come back to one’s native soil, beautifully robed and loaded with honors, is the best thing in life.”在中国传统社会中，宗族和大家庭自然就构成了这样的一个团体，这个团体所做的一件事情就是供其中一员去上学，一直到他考上了功名，得了一官半职，一族人就有靠山了。若在朝廷里没有靠山，在乡间想保持财产是困难的。顾亭林是明朝的一位官员，当改朝换代成了清朝，他拒绝再任官员，深居简出，闭门读书。但是为了安全和保障，他还是不得不派两名外甥到朝廷里去侍奉他的敌人。正如我们已经说过的，这之所以可能做到，是因为中国官员不是与皇帝分享政治权力，是通过淡化和弱化而非支持其权力来服务于君主。外甥做官，保障了舅舅的安全，甚至使舅舅能安心地去下革命的种子。中国传统的官吏并不认真做官，更不想终身做官：打防疫针的人绝不以打针为乐，目的在免疫和免了疫的健康。中国的官吏在做官时庇护其亲友，做了一阵，他任务完成，就要告老还乡了，即所谓“归去来兮”那一套。退隐山林是中国人的理想。这时，上边不必再小心伺候随时可以杀他的主子，周围是感激他的亲戚街坊。此时他只需要享受他的社会声望，生活富足，心宽体胖。正如中国人所说的， “衣锦还乡是人生活中最美好的事情” 。 他绝不冒险去觊觎政权，他的孩子都不准玩“做皇帝”的游戏。他更不想改革社会制度，因为这种社会制度对他并没有害处。一旦他脱离开皇权的限制，他就可以享受地主的经济权利。
Such a man will not attempt to seize power; his children will not play at being emperor. Nor will he have any idea of reforming the social system, for that system will do him no harm. Once out of the way of imperial influences, he may enjoy the economic power of a landowner. This is the sort of man I mean by gentry. The gentry may be returned officials or the relatives of officials or simply educated landowners. In any case, they have no real political power in shaping policies and may have no direct connection with politics whatsoever, yet they do tend to have influence at court and to be immune from political exploitation. And the more fearful the ruler and the more tiger-like, the more valuable is the gentry’s protective covering. In such circumstances it is difficult to survive except by attaching one’s self to some big family.这种人就是我所谓的“士绅” 。士绅可以是退任的官僚，或是官僚的亲属，甚至可以是受过教育的地主。在任何情况下，他们都没有左右政策的实际的政治权力，可能与政治也没有任何直接的联系，可是他们常常有势力，势力就是政治免疫性。统治者越可怕，越像猛虎一样，士绅的保护性的庇护作用就越大。在此情况下，托庇于豪门才有命。
编辑推荐：
费孝通英文原作《中国士绅》首次国内出版
理解士绅阶层于中国传统社会的功能
解读中国社会的“超稳定结构”编辑推荐：
《江村经济》（英汉对照版）
费孝通（著）赵旭东、秦志杰（译）
外语教学与研究出版社
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