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【博雅双语名家名作】梁漱溟：这个世界会好吗（二）
这个世界会好吗？Has Man a Future? –Dialogues with the Last Confucian
作者简介：梁漱溟，著名思想家、教育家、社会活动家。
艾恺，美国哈佛大学博士，师从费正清、史华慈，当代最活跃、最有影响力的汉学家之一，芝加哥大学历史系教授。
内容简介：1980年美国汉学家艾恺采访中国著名的思想家、哲学家、现代新儒家的早期代表人物梁漱溟的谈话实录，并由艾恺译成英文；品评李大钊、陈独秀、毛泽东、周恩来、蒋介石、胡适等风云人物，回顾了任教北大、从事乡建运动、创建民主同盟等传奇经历。
My impression of Hu Zongnan and Chen Cheng我对胡宗南和陈诚的印象
Liang: It was pretty good that I would go to Shandong with Jiang Baili. [Later] Jiang Baili told me that there was someone who wanted to meet me, and asked me if I was willing to see him. I asked him who it was. He answered that it was one of Chiang’s generals, Hu Zongnan. I answered that I was willing to meet with anyone, no matter whom, especially at this critical moment for the War of Resistance. The greater the degree of solidarity, the greater the chance of success in resisting Japan. He said, “Alright, tomorrow we will pass through Xuzhou (Hu Zongnan was stationed in Xuzhou). We’ll go together to have a talk with Hu.” The next day, we went by railroad through Xuzhou. Hu Zongnan, his chief of staff, and his secretary general were all waiting at the station for us. We went to Hu’s headquarters and talked the whole night. The next day the same train, at the same time, passed through Xuzhou and we boarded and went on to Shandong. Later in Xi’an, I had some further contact with Hu. He was a politically ambitious man. He didn’t want to be just a military man so he wanted to make friends with us.梁： 那么很好了，我就要陪着蒋百里先生去山东了，蒋百里先生就问我，说有一个人呢，想同你见面，你可以不可以见他啊？我说是谁啊？他说是蒋介石的一个大将，叫胡宗南。我说是什么人 都可以见，特别这个时候要共同抗日嘛，那么大家越能够联合、越能够团结越好嘛。他说那么样子，我明天从南京坐火车路过徐州——胡宗南正驻在徐州，我们在徐州下车，同他见面谈一谈。后来果然我们一同坐火车路过徐州的时候，胡宗南带着他的参谋长，带着旁的什么秘书长，很多人，在车站等候，接我们。我跟蒋百里就一同到他的司令部，住一夜，谈话。然后第二天，火车在同一个钟点再过来的时候，我们上车去山东。后来我跟胡宗南还有一些接触，后来在陕西西安有些接触。胡宗南他是一个在政治上有野心的人，他并不是想单做一个军人，所以他愿意同我们交朋友。
I also had contact with the subordinate that Chiang Kai-shek trusted most, Chen Cheng. This was at the time of the retreat back to defend Wuhan. Chen Cheng was living at Wuhan University. Wuhan University was located in Luojiashan. Chen lived there. He asked me to his house for dinner and to talk. He was one of the most powerful of Chiang Kai-shek’s subordinates. A car was sent to pick us up. So we got in and went to his house at Luojiashan within Wuhan University campus—the university had been closed. He was not in. But after a few minutes of sitting there waiting, he came in. He talked, but talked about his own topic continually—criticizing, maligning and berating the Minister of the Interior, Huang Shaohong. He said that Huang was a big dummy. He kept talking continually and didn’t let me get a word in edgewise. He just kept on, in a very disorganized manner, very angrily. Later one of his staff came in to report that it was time for dinner. So he invited us to go in to dinner. Now, during the time he was eating, of course, he couldn’t talk much, but he was by no means quiet. After he finished eating, he continued his non-stop diatribe, giving me no chance at all to say anything.跟蒋的部下、蒋的很信任的人，比如陈诚，陈诚也同我有往来，那是退守武汉的时候了。退守武汉的时候，陈诚他住在武汉大学里头，武汉大学那个地名叫珞珈山，他自己住在珞珈山武汉大学里边，他请我到他家里头吃饭、谈话，他算是蒋下面很有力量的一个人。车来接我们，我当然就坐车去了。到他住的地方珞珈山武汉大学里边——学校是停了，他没回来，可是坐了有刚刚几分钟他就回来了。回来了他就谈话了，他老是谈话，老是说他的话，老是骂人、批评人，特别批评那个内政部长黄绍竑，他说那是个草包，这个样子。几乎没有空让我说话，我插不上话去，因为他老说、老说，话说得很乱，气很盛。后来伺候的人来报告，说是要开晚饭了，请进去吃饭，吃饭的时候嘛，不能多说话了，他也还不闲着，吃完饭后还是说话，我想跟他说的话，几乎没有空说。
I took the opportunity when he was speaking relatively slowly to say something because I wanted to say something about the condition of my people. We had brought out some men and rifles from Shandong, over 800 men and more than 800 rifles. We also had tens of thousands of silver dollars in cash. As the administrative commissioner and the county magistrate, we brought out the cash and the armed militia. So I told him that we wanted to go back to Shandong. The militia wanted to fight its way back home. Finally, after much effort, I brought up the matter by cutting off his tirade. So, after this experience with him I felt that he wasn’t a man of great ability; he was too shallow and superficial. This is an example of the contact I had with people on Chiang’s side. Later on, in Taiwan, Chen Cheng was “vice president” and so on.当然我还是勉强趁着一个机会，他话稍微慢一点了，我马上说一句话跟他，因为我是要介绍我这方面的人的情况，我们从山东带出来一批人，并且都是带着枪的，武装的，八百多人，有八百多条枪，还带着十几万块钱——因为我们在山东做专员、做县长有现款、有壮丁，都带出来了。后来嘛跟他说，说我们要回去，我们从山东出来的人要打回老家去，为了跟他说这个事情。仅仅是末了当他话稍微停下来的时候，我才能把我的话跟他说。这样看起来，这个人不是十分有能力的人，太浅，太粗浅。这也是蒋方的人我接触的一个例子。后来不是到台湾他还是做“副总统”吗？
Chiang Kai-shek’s greatest contribution 蒋介石最大的贡献
Liang: When General George Marshall came to China to help make peace between the two parties, I had a lot of contact with him. He came to see me at my house once. That was when I was living at Lanjiazhuang in Nanjing. That was where the headquarters of the Democratic League was located. I couldn’t speak English, so a friend of mine, Ye Duyi, interpreted for me. I felt that General Marshall was a truly good person. He was a devoutly religious man. Chiang Kai-shek was really bothered by him. Didn’t Chiang go hide himself off at Lushan? At the time, the weather was not really all that hot. Of course, Lushan was a cool place, but he didn’t go off there to escape the heat. He wanted to hide from Marshall. This put General Marshall in a bad position. He repeatedly went to Lushan. He went up to Lushan nine times.梁：马歇尔元帅不是来中国吗？极力要促成中国国内的和平。我跟马帅有多次见面，他还到我住的地方来过一次，我住南京兰家庄的时候，民盟的总部，来过一次。我不会讲英语了，都由一个朋友——姓叶的叶笃义，替我做翻译。我对于马帅，我觉得他这个人是很好。他是一个信仰宗教信得很真的人。他很为蒋介石所苦——蒋介石他躲到庐山上去，天气并不一定很热，庐山固然凉快，可是他不是为凉快去庐山，他是躲人，他要躲马帅。那么这个样子马帅就辛苦了，他一趟上庐山，再一趟上庐山，他九上庐山。
Alitto: Speaking of Chiang Kai-shek hiding out, in your opinion, after the War of Resistance was concluded, it seemed he… In terms of this kind of behavior he exhibited in those days, it would seem that it was very stupid. He brought trouble upon himself and so in the end exited the stage pitifully. In your opinion, why did Chiang act so stupidly? Did he just underestimate the strength of the Communists or was he just stupid?艾： 说到蒋介石躲人啊，依您看呢，他是抗战结束以后啊，他好像现在看他当年这个行为，好像很笨啊，是自己找自己的麻烦而终于下场也很惨。依您看呢，是因为他估计共产党的力量估计得太低的关系呢，还是因为他人就是很笨呢？
Liang: Well, he was not stupid, all right. However, if it was stupidity, it was just because he was so selfish.梁： 笨是不笨，如果说笨呢，他就是太自私。
Alitto: Selfish? The basic problem was that he was selfish?艾： 自私？基本的问题是他自私？
Liang: He didn’t trust people. His word never...梁： 他不信任人，从来说话
Alitto: Meant anything?艾： 都不算话。
Liang: Right! He acted this way thinking himself to be very clever. But what he did was to make himself utterly isolated.梁： 对啊。他自己以为这样最得计，其实是弄得众叛亲离。
Alitto: So, in your view, if after the War of Resistance had concluded, he had been earnestly reasonable with the Communist Party and with the Third Parties, then possibly he would have been able to organize a coalition government. Was it just because he wanted to maintain his dictatorial powers that he refused to be reasonable? (Liang: Right.) Because he thought that he had more troops, had good weapons, (Liang: He had U.S. backing.) he had an air force, the CCP didn’t have an air force—no matter what, the Nationalist was much stronger than the CCP. (Liang: Many conditions were stronger.) So because of this, he then refused. (Liang: He looked down upon the CCP.) He looked down on the CCP. For example in 1938, the CCP was obviously quite strong, especially in North China and the Northeast. Why didn’t he see that the situation was not good, and so make concessions or at least be relatively earnest in the peace talks?艾： 那您看他是，就是说抗战结束以后，假如他比较认真地和共产党、和第三方面的人比较讲理，那说不定会组成一个联合 政府。那么会不会就是因为他要保存他这个独裁的权力啊，而结果可以说是拒绝讲理？因为他想：我这个军队多啊，武装也好啊，（梁：有美国做后盾。）空军是有的，他们没有空军，无论怎么样，我们比他们强得多。（梁：很多的条件都强啊。）就是因为这个，他就拒绝，（梁：轻视共产党。）轻视共产党，比如到了民国二十七年（1938年），共产党尤其在华北、在东北很明显地是力量不小。他为什么不看情况不妙而让步，或者起码比较认真地和谈呢？
Liang: His attitude towards the peace talks was to take any small advantage. So, one time Premier Zhou came to him with a proposal that was a concession on the CCP’s part, and thought that this would satisfy him. But Chiang came back and said that there was still a problem, and this problem called for a further concession from the CCP. So he kept pressing them continually. The CCP knew quite well that it did not have as much power as Chiang did, and knew that it didn’t have international recognition as the government of China as Chiang did, or have American help. So, the situation was like, as the saying in ancient Chinese goes, “troops full of righteous indignation will certainly prevail; troops full of pride will certainly be defeated.” It was the CCP’s troops that had been continually pressed and filled with righteous indignation.梁： 他在和谈上他采取的方针、策略，就是他多占一分便宜就多占一分便宜。有一次，周恩来代表共产党让步了，让步了以为可以满足他了，他说还有一个问题，在这个问题上又让步了，还有一点，如此，就是这样。他就是老是逼人，共产党也自己知道自己没有他那样大的力量了，没有像他还有国际的，国际承认他是中国，美国的帮助啊，所以中国这个老话，老话讲军事上啊，“哀兵必胜，骄兵必败”，你骄傲，刚好就是共产党是哀兵，受逼迫的。
Alitto: During the peace negotiations you must have had some opportunities to speak sincerely to Chiang, and try to persuade him to be more serious and conscientious with the peace talks.艾： 那这个谈判过程中，您也许有机会很诚恳地劝蒋介石，要他认真一点吧？
Liang: I had great difficulty in getting to see him. Not only did I have difficulty, even the Nationalist Party leaders had difficulty in seeing him. It was a big headache for General Marshall. He hated Chiang. Didn’t he serve as Secretary of State after returning to the U.S.? At that time, he wanted no part of helping Chiang Kai-shek.梁： 我们很难见到他呀。不但我们很难见到他，就是国民党的政府负责的人，见他都不容易。马帅很头疼，很恨他，回到美国之后不是担任国务卿吗？那个时候，他完全不想帮助蒋介石。
Alitto: A lot of Americans who had lived in China for a long time felt that way. For example, there was John Stuart Service. He was in Chongqing. He also read my book manuscript and urged me to publish it without revision. He wrote a few words in it, saying that this book wasn’t bad, and so on. Another example was John Patton Davies. I don’t remember his Chinese name. Still another was my teacher John Fairbank. They all said that Chiang was wrong, and that the Chiang regime was corrupt. A lot of Americans feared a Communist success, especially feared the Soviet Union; they thought that the CCP was nothing but a tool of the Soviet Union.Do you think that Chiang Kai-shek made any contribution at all to China and the Chinese Revolution? We have regarded his performance, especially after the War of Resistance, as terrible. As for his overall career, is there any contribution to China?艾： 有很多住中国住得久的人，例如谢伟思，他是在重庆，他也看了我这个，就是因为他看了这个稿子，他劝我就不要再改啊，立刻出版，在这里写了几个字，就说这本书不错什么的。谢伟思是一位，还有戴维斯，中文名字我不记得，姓戴维斯，连费正清啊，他们都说蒋介石是错的，而且政府是腐败的，没有用处。美国很怕共产党，尤其怕的是苏联，以为中国共产党就是苏联的这个走狗啊，或者它的猫手、猫爪。您觉得蒋介石对中国、对中国革命有没有什么贡献呢？我们已经谈到了他，尤其在抗战以后啊，实在不行，不过就是说他的整个的事业了，会不会对中国有什么贡献？
Liang: His greatest contribution was to make the CCP successful. If he had been a bit more trustworthy, if his character were somewhat better, the CCP would have been unable to beat him. His greatest contribution was to have created the CCP success.梁： 他最大的贡献哪，最大的贡献是给机会让共产党他造成了共产党的成功。如果他这个人还有一点信用，人格还好一点，共产党打不过他啊。所以他最大的贡献，就是造成共产党的成功。
Zhou Enlai is a paragon周恩来是一个完人
Alitto: You were also familiar with Zhou Enlai.艾： 周恩来您也
Liang: I knew him very well.梁： 很熟了。
Alitto: What dealings or contact did you have with him?艾： 您和他有过什么来往、接触？
Liang: It was in politics. First it was in Chongqing. Because North and East China had fallen; we all lived in Chongqing. At that time, I had dealings with him, very close dealings. Later Japan was defeated, and all of us went to Nanjing. The Chinese Communist Party office was at Meiyuanxincun. Our Democratic League office was at Lanjiazhuang. At this time we were coordinating peace talks between the two [major] parties....梁： 就是在政治上嘛。先是在重庆了，因为中国华北、华东都沦陷了，我们大家都在重庆，那个时候来往了，来往得很密。后来日本失败了，大家都去到南京了，中共的办事处在梅园新村，我们民盟在兰家庄，这个时候两党和谈我们彼此是配合的
Alitto: Do you have other evaluations or views of Premier Zhou?艾： 您对周恩来总理有什么别的评价、看法？
Liang: When the two major parties were conducting peace talks, General Marshall from the U.S. very much wanted to make the two major parties have peace talks. I was the general secretary of the Democratic League. I was also engaged in this work, and wanted to pursue domestic peace and establish a new China. At the time Mr. Zhou was first in Chongqing and later in Nanjing, so we were very close, and I had the most dealings with him. Finally there was a transitional government organized, with 40 members: 20 Nationalist Party members, and the remaining 20 positions divided up among the parties outside the Nationalist Party. That book I just mentioned discusses this question. What did it discuss? That the Nationalist Party allowed the Communist Party and the Democratic League 13 positions. Whether it should be 13 or 14 was still debated.梁： 在两大党和谈的时候，美国来的是马歇尔元帅，他是很想促成两党的和谈的。我是作为民盟的秘书长，我也是做这个工作，想求得国内的和平、建设新中国，所以那个时候周公先在重庆、后在南京，我们是最密切的，往来最多的。最后要组织一个过渡的政府，国民政府委员40名，国民党占20名，剩下的20名国民党以外的大家分，我刚才提到的那个书里（梁漱溟借给艾恺的某本书）讲到这个问题，讲到什么呢？讲到国民党许给共产党跟民盟13 名，是 13 名嘛还是 14 名嘛，还在那里争论
The Chinese Democratic League was not one group, it was an alliance, and so he made this gesture. The Nationalist Party’s Central Daily News and some Shanghai newspapers ridiculed the Democratic League as the tail of the Communist Party, as going along with the Communist Party. I made a statement to the press that the Communist Party was following the Democratic League’s lead, and not the vice versa. What did I mean by that? I meant that the Communist Party was a revolutionary party. It was an armed party that wanted to seize all of China. We had urged them to renounce armed force and cooperate with the Nationalist Party in creating a new China. We had urged it to renounce armed force. It had agreed to do so, and so it agreed with me to follow the path of the Democratic League, and it was by no means a case of me following the Communist Party. This was discussed in that little book. But one thing was quite clear: at the time the Democratic League was cooperating with the Communist Party. The Nationalist Party totally regarded us as doing so.中国民盟不是个单一的团体，是个联合的，所以它作出这个样的一个表示。这样一个表示呢，国民党的《中央日报》，还有上海的报纸就嘲笑民盟，说民盟是共产党的尾巴，跟着共产党跑的。我就有一个声明，对新闻记者的谈话，我说是共产党随着民盟走的，而不是我们随着共产党走。怎么样子说这个话呢？因为共产党是革命党，它是有武装的，它要夺取整个的中国的，我们是劝它放弃武力，跟国民党在建设新中国上可以合作。是我们劝它放弃武力的，它同意了，所以是它同意了我的话，走民盟的这个路子，并不是我跟着共产党走，那个本子上都讲了这个话。但是一个很清楚的事情就是，当时民盟跟共产党是合作的，国民党完全是这样来看待我们的。
Alitto: Leaving aside Premier Zhou’s political aspects, what kind of man was he?艾： 周总理政治方面以外，是个什么样的人啊？
Liang: I was very close to Premier Zhou. I am confident that I understood him. In ancient Chinese, the best person was called a “paragon,” and I totally regarded Mr. Zhou as a paragon. There was nothing you could find fault with, no matter whether in his public or private morals. For example, he and Deng Yingchao had no children. Madame Deng seemed to have said that he could take another woman, but he didn’t want to do so. In this area of marital relations, which was a private matter, he was very clean. In his work, he helped Chairman Mao in dealing with both internal matters of China and with the international area. One could say that before and especially after the founding of the state, if Premier Zhou was not handling things internal and foreign, well, Mao alone could not have handled it and would have failed; he relied on Zhou for both. Zhou worked like blazes. Everyone knows that he sometimes did not eat; he had no time to eat, so he was given something in the car and had a few bites, and immediately took off. He would work into the night. He received many foreigners, straight into the night, and slept very little, and didn’t care much about food. One could say that he gave himself completely to his nation. 梁： 我同周总理算是很熟悉了，我自信我很了解他。中国古话说最好的人叫做“完人”，完全，我看周公是一个完人，无论是在公德方面、私德方面，都没有可以挑剔的。比如他同邓颖超没有孩子，邓好像说是你可以结合另外一个女人，他就不要。在这种男女夫妇的关系上——这算是一个私人的事情，他很干净。在工作方面他帮助毛主席，无论是国内应付各方面、国际上应付各方面，全是他啊，没有周那不行的。新中国，可以说从建国前夕，特别是建国后，没有周总理应付内、应付外，那毛一个人办不了，成不了事情，都是靠周啊。周是拼命的，最辛苦了。大家都知道，他常常是没有法子吃饭，没有空吃饭，跑到汽车上人家给他送来饭，吃几口，马上就开走了。夜里头都办公啊。许多外国人，他会客，一直到深夜啊，睡眠很少，吃东西也很不讲究，勉勉强强，可以说是把自己一切全贡献给国家了。
If China hadn’t had Zhou these several decades, it would not have succeeded. Zhou best understood Mao’s wishes. My critique of him is that he was by nature a second fiddle. He asked Mao for instructions practically constantly and for everything. Mao would hint at something and he would immediately understand. Mao didn’t have to say much. But he [Zhou] himself had very few specific opinions. He went along with Mao completely. One could say that he was Mao’s best assistant. He was number two, never the first in command. An old Chinese saying is “a sage ruler and a worthy prime minister.” He was the virtuous prime minister. When Zhou died, people from all sides, even the common people… There was no one who didn’t miss him, admire him and grieve
for him. Even when Mao died, it wasn’t like this. Of the three [Mao, Zhou and Zhu], Zhou died first. Many people honored his memory in front of Tian’anmen.中国过去的几十年没有周是不行的，国际上、国内都是靠周。周呢，最能懂得毛的意思，我对他的评价：他是天生的第二把手。他是几乎随时、任何一件事情他都请示毛，毛一点，他就明白了，不要多说。可是他自己很少自己的明确的主张，他完全跟着毛走，可说是毛的最好最好的助手了。他是第二把手，不是第一。中国古话有“圣君贤相”，他是个贤相。他故去了，各方面的人啊，乃至老百姓，没有人不想他的，没有人不佩服他的、追念他的。毛故去都没有这个情况。他们三个人周是最先故去的，在天安门前头多少人纪念他啊。
编辑推荐：
他只有中学文凭，却被蔡元培请到北京大学任教；
他成长于京城，却长期致力于乡村建设；
他一生研究儒家学说，然而内心向往佛家生活……
“梁先生有些类似于甘地这样的圣者，通过自己的不断奔走感化大地，于改造人生与社会中践履一己的感悟”
《这个世界会好吗》（汉英对照）
梁漱溟 艾恺（著） 艾恺（译）
外语教学与研究出版社
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